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The Dartmouth College Case and Private Corporations.
Chancellor Kent, writing in 1826, thus expressed himself
concerning the Dartmouth College case: * "It contains one
of the most full and elaborate expositions of the constitutional
sanctity of contracts to be met with in any of the reports.
The decisjpji_in_that case did more than any other single act
proceeding from the authority of the United States to throw
an impregnable barrier around all rights and franchises derived
from the grant of government and to give solidity and
inviolability to the literary, charitable, religious and commer-
cial institutions of our country."
Another learned commentator, Mr. Justice Cooley, writing
nearly fifty years later, adds to his statement of the doctrine
established in that case the following:f "It _is_nadfir the
protection of the decision in the Dartmouth College case that
the most enormouTT-and- -threatening powers in our country
have been created, some of the great and wealthy corporations
having greater influence in the country at large and upon the
legislation of the country than the states to which they owe
their corporate existence. Everyjriyilege granted or right
conferred, no matter by what means or on what pretence,
being made inviolable by the constitution, the government is
* 1 Kent's Comm. 419.
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The IJartmouth College Gase and Private Corporations. 
Chancellor Kent, writing in 1826, thus expressed himself 
concerning the Dartmouth College case: * "It contains one 
-0£ the most full and elaborate expositions of the constitutional 
sanctity of contracts to be met with in any of the reports. 
The de~hat case did more t4an any other single act 
proceeding from the authority of the United States to throw 
.an impregnable barrier around all rights and franchises derived 
from the grant of government and to give solidity and 
inviolability to the literary, charitable, religious and commer-
-0ial institutions of our country." 
Another learned commentator, Mr. Justice Cooley, writing 
nearly fifty years later, adds to his statement of the doctrine 
established in that case the following : t " It j§Jlllder the 
protection of the decision in the Dartmouth College case that 
the--most eno:fiiiotm and -th"reateclng -powers in our country 
have been created, some of the great and wealthy corporations 
having greater influence in the country at large and upon the 
legislation of the country than the states to which they owe 
their corporate existence. Everu!iriI~ge granted or right 
conferred, no matter by what , means or on what pretence, 
being made inviolable by the constitution, the government is 
* 1 Kent's Comm. 419. 
t Cooley's Const. Lim., 279-80, n. 
(3) 
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frequently found stripped of its authority in very important
particulars by unwise, careless or corrupt legislation, and a
clause in the federal constitution, -whose purpose was to pre-
clude the repudiation of debts and just contracts, protects and
perpetuates the evil."
During the period which has elapsed since Chancellor Kent
wrote, the great development of private corporations has taken
place in this country, their wealth and strength have im-
mensely increased, and they have become possessed, unques-
tionably, of vast and dangerous powers. And these contrasted
statements of the effects of this decision present a most inter-
esting inquiry. The first represents an opinion which pre-
vailed in the profession and in the courts long after the
decision was made, and which still receives strong support
from the bar and from the decisions of the highest tribunals.
But it must be acknowledged that the second of the foregoing
statements is only a moderate expression of professional and
public opinion upon this important subject. While, on the
one hand, it is maintained that the original adjudication was
not only right in itself, but has been rightly affirmed and
applied in succeeding cases and should not be disturbed; that
the court which originally pronounced it should not and will
not take any backward steps in respect to the doctrine estab-
lished; on the other hand, not only has the correctness of the
decision been repeatedly challenged, but a swelling chorus of
denunciation, proceeding from lawyers and the press and the
people, assails it as fons et origo of monstrous wrong and per-
nicious consequences, and predictions manifold are not want-
ing that it must sooner or later be reviewed and reversed.
It cannot, therefore, be inappropriate for an association of the
bar of the country to consider whether the effect of this great
judgment has been beneficent or evil; whether alleged abuses
of corporate powers and alleged corporate-encroachments upon
public rights, which are at present engaging the solicitude of
lawyers, legislators and the people alike, are chiefly attributa-
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frequently found stripped of its authority in very important 
particulars by unwise, careless or corrupt legislation, and a 
clause in the federal constitution, whose purpose was to pre-
clude the repudiation of debts and just contracts, protects and 
perpetuates the evil." 
During the period which has elapsed since Chancellor Kent 
wrote, the great development of private corporations has taken 
place in this country, their wealth and strength have im-
mensely increased, and they hav_e become possessed, unques-
tionably, of vast and dangerous powers. And these contrasted 
statements of the effects of this decision present a most inter-
esting inquiry. The first represents an opinion which pre-
vailed in the profession and in the courts long after the 
decision was made, and which still receives strong support 
from the bar and from the decisions of the highest tribunals. 
But it must be acknowledged that the second of the foregoing 
statements is only a moderate expression of professional and 
public opinion upon this important subject. While, on the 
one hand, it is maintained that the original adjudication was 
not only right in itself, but has been rightly affirmed and 
applied in succeeding cases and should not be disturbed ; that 
the court which originally pronounced it should not and will 
not take any backward steps in respect to the doctrine estab-
lished ; on the other hand, not only has the correctness of the 
decision been repeatedly challenged, but a swelling chorus of 
denunciation, proceeding from lawyers and the press and the 
people, assails it as Jons et origo of monstrous wrong and per-
nicious consequences, and predictions manifold are not want-
ing that it must sooner or later be reviewed and reversed. 
It cannot, therefore, be inappropriate for an association of the 
bar of the country to consider whether the effect of this great 
judgment has been beneficent or evil; whether alleged abuses 
of corporate powers and alleged corporate'encroachments upon 
public rights, which are at present engaging the solicitude of 
lawyers, legislators and the people alike, are chiefly attributa-
ble to or find support in the decision ; whether corporations 
find in the courts under it an "impregnable barrier" behind
which they may do mischief, or only a just shelter for their
clear rights; whether the judicial tribunals have only justly
applied a clause of the federal constitution, or have pressed
the decision too far, with evil consequences to the people.
Such consideration, in other words, involves an inquiry into
the connection, real or supposed, between the Dartmouth Col-
lage case and the pressing questions of corporate power, re-
sponsibility and restraint which are now the subjects of great
public anxiety. But the appropriate limits of the discussion
only allow a suggestive rather than a thorough treatment of
the topic.
The inquiry first requires a brief consideration of the
doctrine established and its applications. But it is unnecessary
to examine at any length the cases in the federal and state
courts in which the principle of the leading case has been
applied, for this would be only a repetition of familiar learn-
ing. It will be sufficient to notice the well-known rules flow-
ing from the original decision, which have been administered
for the protection of private business corporations. It will
appear that the decisions, during a period of sixty-five years,
have affirmed a body of legal rules, as applications of the
doctrine of the leading case, which, to say the least, consti-
tute a strong and valuable support of corporate privileges.
A strict statement of the decision in the principal case,*
in 1819, is, that the charters of private corporations are
contracts between the legislature and the corporations*, having
for their consideration the liabilities and duties which the
corporations assume by accepting them, and the grant of the
franchise can no more be resumed by the legislature, or its
benefits diminished or impaired, without the consent of the
grantees, than any other grant of property or valuable thing,
unless the right to do so is reserved in the charter itself.







































































































































find in the courts under it an "impregnable barrier" behind 
which they may do mischief, or only a just shelter for their 
clear rights; whether the judicial tribunals have only justly 
applied a clause of the federal constitution, or have pressed 
the decision too far, with evil consequences to the people. 
Such consideration, in other words, involves an inquiry into 
the connection, real or supposed, between the Dartmouth Col-
lage . case and the pressing questions of corporate power, re-
sponsibility and restraint which are now the subjects of great 
public anxiety. But the appropriate limits of the discussion 
only allow a suggestive rather than a thorough treatment of 
the topic. 
The inquiry first requires a brief consideration of the 
doctrine established and its applications. But it is unnecessary 
to examine at any length the cases in the federal and state 
courts in which the principle of the leading case has been 
applied, for this would be only a repetition of familiar learn-
mg. It will be sufl!.cient to notice the well-known rules flow-
1\. ing from the original decision; which have been administered 
for the protection of private business corporations. It will 
~ appear that the decisions, during a period of sixty-five years, 
have affirmed a body of legal rules, as applications of the 
doctrine of the leading case, which, to say the least, consti-
tute a strong and valuable support of corporate privileges. 
A strict statement of the decision in the principal case,* 
in 1819, is, that the charters of p,ri".ate . c,o~p_()r~ti_ons are 
contracts between the legislature and the corporation~, having 
for their consideration the liabilities and duties which the 
corporations assume by accepting them, and the grant of the 
franchise can no more be resumed by the legislature, or its 
benefits diminished or impaired, without the consent of the 
grantees, than any other grant of property or valuable thing, 
unless the right to do so is reserved in the charter itself. 
*The Dartmouth College Case, 4 Wheaton, 518. 
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This principle, in subsequent cases, was held to embrace all
contracts, executed and executory, between the state and
private corporations;* and it was also settled that the in-
alidity of legislation impairing the contract does not depend
upon the extent of the impairment^
I. Let us consider, at the outset, the beneficial results to
corporations of the Dartmouth College case. It was inevitable,
when such a decision had been announced by the supreme
tribunal of the federal government, that corporations would
at once perceive its value to them, and be swift to seize upon
the advantages it conferred upon them. A mere glance at
the familiar classes of cases in which the principle has been
applied, shows their variety and importance, and that business
corporations have never failed to invoke its protection when-
ever their chartered rights have been drawn into controversy.
(1) In respect to the title to corporate property, derived
from the state, other than franchises, it was soon established,
by many decisions, that legislative grants to corporations vest
an absolute title, which could not be afterwards resumed or
controlled by the legislature, any more than an absolute grant
to individuals.It having been previously decided that legis-
lative grants are irrepealable,J the decision that a charter is a
contract, brought all property granted by a charter within the
protection given to grants to individuals. The value of such
a principle to private business corporations is at once apparent.
It is only necessary to refer to the history of state and federal
legislation, which has conferred upon them profuse grants of
property, to show how beneficial to corporations the adminis-
tration of this rule of law has been. The disposition to
* Green vs. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1; Bridge Proprietors eg. Hoboken, 1 Wall.
116.
t Planters' Bank vs. Sharp, 6 How. 327; Bronson t>g. Kinzie, 1 How.
311.
X Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Terrett vs. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43;






































































































































This principle, in subsequent cases, was held to embrace all 
contracts, executed and executory, between the state and 
private corporations;* and it was also settled that the in-
alidity of legislation impairing the contract does not depend 
upon the extent of the impairment. t 
I. Let us consider, at the outset, the beneficial results to-
corporations of the Dartmouth College case. It was inevitable, 
when such a decision had been announced by the supreme 
tribunal of the federal government, that corporations would 
at once perceive its value to them, and be swift to seize upon 
the advantages it conferred upon them. A mere glance at 
the familiar classes of cases in which the principle has been 
applied, shows their variety and importance, and that business 
corporations have never failed to invoke its protection when-
ever their chartered·rights have been. drawn into controversy. 
tl) In respect to the title to corporate property, derived 
from the state, other than franchises, it W88 soon established, 
by many decisions, that legislative grants to corporations vest 
an absolute title, which could not be aft~rwards resumed' or 
controlled by the legislature; any mo;;-th~~-~~ ·absolute grant 
to individmds:-it havin·g·teen-pre-viously decided that legis-
lative grants are irrepealable,t the decision that a charter is a 
contract, brought all property granted by a charter within the 
protection given to grants to individuals. The value of such 
a principle to private business corporations is at once apparent. 
It is only necessary to refer to the history of state and federal 
legislation, which has conferred upon them profuse grants of 
property, to show how beneficili.l to corporations the adminis-
tration of this rule of law has been. The disposition to 
*Green vs. Biddle, 8 Wheat. I; Bridge Proprietors vs. Hoboken, 1 Wall. 
116. 
t Planters' Bank vs. Sharp, 6 How. 327; Bronson vs. Kinzie, 1 How. 
311. 
t Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Terrett vs. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43 ;-
Town of Pawlet vs. Clark, Ibid. 292; Davis vs. Gray, 16 Wall. 203. 
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encourage corporate organization and effort, which was
especially indulged in the early history of the country, has
been wrought upon by corporations ever since with unflagging
energy and persistence. The public funds, the public domain,
seem to have been regarded as theirs by right, and state and
federal legislatures, influenced by all manner of solicitation
and importunity, and won by all the arts of conciliation and
persuasion, have enriched corporations by abundant and over-
flowing donations, and thus established and strengthened the
solid structure of their wealth and power.
(2) The same principle, by repeated adjudications, was held
to apply to grants of the franchises of corporations. They
were held to be property, and irrevocable by legislation, after
acceptance by the corporations, on the terms of the charters.
Great as have been the value and benefits of the large grants
"of^-pfoperty made to corporations, these are jsmall compared
with the worth of franchises which, once obtained, bestow
special and ample powers for the acquisition of property, its
consolidation in the hands of corporations, and afford to them
the ability and present the strong temptation to act solely for
their own aggrandizement, in disregard of the public interest.
In the early history of corporations in this country all charters
were special, each resting upon its own terms, and granting
varied privileges, always specially valuable. The development
of the country and its resources justified- the liberal encour-
agement of corporate enterprises, and the grants and fran-
chises conferred by charters were given upon sound consider-
ations of public policy and benefit to the country. But all
business corporations, by the subsequent application to them
of the decision in the principal case, gained enormous power,
and secured a firm foothold for action which inevitably resulted
in aggressions upon the public.
If it be said, as must be conceded, that the inviolability of
grants to corporations, other than franchises, confers upon






































































































































encourage corporate organization and effort, which was 
especially indulged in the early history of the country, has . 
been wrought upon by corporations ever since with unflagging 
energy and persistence. The public funds, the public domain, 
seem to have been regarded as theirs by right, and state and 
federal legislatures, influenced by all manner of solicitation 
and importunity, and won by all the arts of conciliation and 
persuasion, have enriched corporations by abundant and over-
flowing donations, and thus established and strengthened the 
solid structure of their wealth and power. 
(2) The same principle, by repeated adjudications, was held 
to apply to grants of the franchises of corporations. They 
were held to be property, and irrevocable by legislation, after 
acceptance by the corporations, on the terms of the charters. 
Gr~s have been the value and ben. efits of the large grants 
-or-property made to corporations, the~ll compared 
with the worth of franchises which, once obtained, bestow 
special and ample powers for. the acquisition of property, its 
consolidation in the hands of corporations, and afford to them 
the ability and present the strong temptation to act solely for 
their own aggrandizement, in disregard of the public interest. 
In the early history of corporations in this country all charters 
were special, each resting upon its own terms, and granting 
varied privileges, always specially valuable. The development 
of the country and its resources justified· the liberal encour-
1 agement of corporate enterprises, and the grants and fran-
\ chises conferred by charters were given upon sound consider-
i ations of public policy and benefit to the country. But all 
/ business corporations, by the subsequent application to them 
of the decision in the principal case, gained enormous power, 
and secured a firm foothold for action which inevitably resulted 
in aggressions upon the public. 
If it be said, as must be conceded, that the inviolability of 
grants to corporations, other than franchises, confers upon 
them no rights beyond those given by grants to natural 
8
persons, upon sufficient consideration, and rests upon principles
of justice and morality applicable alike to natural and
artificial persons, it may be replied that the chief advantage
which has been derived by corporations from the Dartmouth
College decisions the removal of their franchises "from legis-
lative control, the constant exercise of which is essential to
the public welfare. By the bestowal of such franchises there
are conferred upon corporate and associated capital powers
which individuals cannot have, powers for good certainly, but
also powers for evil, which have been exercised to such public
detriment that the people have been stirred to their depths by a
sense of the immediate and urgent necessity of finding,
under the law and through the judicial tribunals, or above and
outside of them, some effectual means of restraint upon
corporate abuses.
(3) In respect to the use and enjoyment of corporate pro-
perty and franchises, it must be admitted that the principal
decision has been the source of the same priceless advantages
to corporations. The special charters which were granted
under the influence of the sentiment favorable to corporations,
which prevailed alike in legislatives and in courts, generally
included special privileges in the use of corporate franchises
and the carrying on of corporate business. When secured,
these are irrevocable. Corporations thereby become possessed
of the power to determine, without restriction and without
legislative control, the compensation they shall receive for
services, the profits from the use of their property, "its use
and the fruits of that use." In innumerable cases, in the
state and federal courts, the special provisions of charters to
this end have been held to be beyond legislative interference
under the principle of the DartmouthuCollege decision. The
benefits thereby secured to corporations need no description.
The advantages are obvious which they have derived from the
principle that the right to regulate and fix their own compen-






































































































































persons, upon sufficient consideration, and rests upon principles 
of justice and .morality applicable alike to natural and 
artificial persons,. it may be replied that the chief advantage 
which has been cierived by corporations from the Dartmouth 
CoJlege decisim/is the rE)moval of their franchiseslrOfiliegts-
lati ve .. cont~~l, the constant exercise of'·which is essential to 
the public welfare. By the bestowal of such franchises there 
are conferred upon corporate and associated ca.pita! powers 
which individuals cannot have, powers for good certainly, but 
also powers for evil, which have been exercised to such public 
detriment that the people have been stirred to their depths by a 
sense of the immediate and urgent necessity of finding, 
under the law and through the judicial tribunals, or above and 
outside of them, some effectual means of restraint upon 
corporate abuses. 
(3) In respect to the use and enjoyment of corporate pro-
perty and franchises, it must be admitted that the principal 
decision has been the source of the same priceless advantages 
to corporations. The special cnarters which were granted 
under the influence of the se~nt favorable to corporations, 
which prevailed alike in legislatp\'es and in courts, generally 
included special privileges in the use of corporate franchises 
and the carrying on of corporate business. When secured, 
these are irrevocable. Corporations thereby become possessed 
of the power to determine, without restriction and without 
legislative control, the compensation they shall receive for 
services, the profits from the use of their property, "its use 
and the fruits of that use." In innumerable cases, in the 
· state and federal courts, the special provisions of charters to 
this end have been held to be beyond legislative interference 
under the prin~iple of t~~J)art~ decision. The 
benefits thereby' seciifea to corporations need no description. 
The advantages are obvious which they have derived from the 
principle that the right to regulate and fix their own compen-
sation forservices results from their general power to carry on 
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the business for which they are organized, and that such com-
pensation must be determined by the corporate body itself.
The authorities to this effect were uniform* until the compara-
tively recent decisions of the Supreme Court as to the regula-
tion of corporate business, which will be considered hereafter.
It is against this right and this power of corporations to
determine their own charges, and the undeniable abuses thereof,
that the public sentiment referred to has been especially
directed, and which, not yet wholly allayed, though diminished,
has, unintelligently perhaps, found in the leading case the
sole source of corporate injuries to the public.
(4) The exemption of private corporations from taxation
altogether and taxation at special and favorable rates, under
charter provisions, have been of such advantage to them that,
more than any other of their privileges, perhaps, these have
encountered the disapproval and opposition of the people and
the profession; and the established rules of law protecting
such exemptions have challenged, probably, more severe
criticism than any application of the Dartmouth College
decision. The principle that the legislature may make an
irrevocable contract of exemption from taxation does not rest
in its origin upon that decision, It found its earliest asser-
tion in the case of New Jersey vs. Wilson, f in 1812, and the
succeeding cases which affirm the rule profess to rest upon
that case.J The decision was, that under the constitution
the repeal of a law granting total or partial exemption from
*Penn. E. E. Co. vs. Sly, 65 Penn. St. 205; Phil, Wilm. & Bait. E. E.
Co. vs. Bowers, 4 Houst. 506; Hamilton vs. Kutte, 5 Bueh, (Ky.) 458.
t 7 Cranch, 164.
t Gordon vs. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133; Piqua Bank vs. Knoop,
16 How. 369; Ohio Life and Trust Co. vs. Debolt, 16 How. 416; Dodge
vs. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Mech. and Traders Bank vs. Thomas, 18 How.
384; McGee vs. Mathis, 4 Wall. 143; Jefferson Bank vs. Skelly, 1 Black,
436; Home of the Friendless vs. Eouse, 8 Wall. 438; Wilmington Bail-
road vs. Eeid, 13 Wall. 264; Farrington vs. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679!






































































































































the business for which they are organized~ and that such com-
pensation must be determined , by the corporate body itself. 
The authorities to this effect were uniform* until the compara-
tively recent decisions of the Supreme Court as to the .regula-
tion of corporate business, which will be considered hereafter. 
It is against this right and this power of corporations to 
determine their own charges, and the undeniable abuses thereof, 
that the public sentiment referred to has been especially 
directed, and which, not yet wholly allayed, though diminished, 't 
has, unintelligently perhaps, found in the leading case the , 
sole source of corporate injuries to the public. 
(4) The exemption of private corporations from taxation 
altogether and taxation at special and favorable rates, under 
charter provisions, have been of such advantage to them that, 
more than any other of their privileges, perhaps, these have 
encountered the disapproval and opposition of the people and 
the profession; and the established rules of law protecting 
such exemptions have challenged, probably, more severe 
criticism than any application of the Dartmouth College 
decision. The principle that the legislature may make an 
irrevocable contract of exemption from taxation does not rest 
in its origin upon that decision, It found its earliest asser-
tion in the case of New Jersey vs. Wilson, tin 1812, and the 
succeeding cases which affirm the rule profess to rest upon 
that case.t The decision was, that under the constitution 
the repeal of a law granting total or partial exemption from 
*Penn. R. R. Co. vs. Sly, 65 Penn. St. 205; Phil., Wilm. & Bait. R. R. 
Co. vs. Bowers, 4 Roust. 506; Hamilton vs. Kutte, 5 Bush, (Ky.) 458. 
t 7 Cranch, 164. 
t Gordon vs. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133; Piqua Bank i•s. Knoop, 
16 How. 369; Ohio Life and Trust Co. vs. Debolt, 16 How. 416; Dodge 
vs. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Mech. and Traders Bank vs. Thomas, 18 How. 
384; McGee vs. Mathis, 4 Wall.143; Jefferson Bank v.~. Skelly, 1 Black, 
436; Home of the Friendless 11s. Rouse, 8 Wall. 438; Wilmington Rail-
road t•s. Reid, 13 Wall. 264; Farrington t•s. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679 i 
Murray vs. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432. 
10
taxation impairs the contract made by the grant of the privi-
lege. Whether or not it was rightly decided that the prohibi-
tion of the constitution applied to the exemption in question
in the case, it has remained as the basis of subsequent decis-
ions and has been repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court,
though not without most strenuous dissent by a strong minor-
ity of the court. But it is by virtue of the decision in the
Dartmouth College case that the principle has its application
to private corporations. The decision that a charter is a
contract made available to them the doctrine that contracts of
exemption from taxation are protected by the constitution,
notwithstanding that the states are, by such contracts, deprived
of the exercise of one of the powers of sovereignty. And
the majority of the cases in which the principle established in
New Jersey vs. Wilson has been affirmed have been cases
where corporate charters providing for exemption from taxa-
tion have been drawn in question. In one of these cases it is
said that " attempted state taxation is the mode most frequently
adopted to affect contracts contrary to the constitutional inhi-
bition. It most frequently calls for the exercise of our super-
visory power."*
And this supervisory power the court ha3 steadily exercised
to declare void all state legislation impairing contracts of
exemption made with corporations in their charters. Not-
withstanding the earnest opposition and protests of the
minority of the court, at all times, the majority has not failed
to protect the contract of exemption when the provisions of
the charter clearly expressed it. And one of the minority
has not hesitated to say that the court has been " at times
quick to discover a contract, that it might be protected, and
slow to perceive that what are claimed to be contracts were not
so, by reason of the want of authority in those who profess to
bind others. This has been especially apparent in regard to
contracts made by legislatures of states, and by those municipal






































































































































taxation impairs the contract made by the grant of the privi-
lege. Whether or not it was rightly decided that the prohibi-
tion of the constitution applied to the exemption in question 
in the case, it has remained as the basis of subsequent decis-
ions and has been repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court, 
though not without most strenuous dissent by a strong minor-
ity of the court. But it is by virtue of the decision in the 
Dartmouth College case that the principle has its application 
to private corporations. The decision that a charter is a 
contract made available to them the doctrine that contracts of 
exemption from taxation are protected by the constitution, , 
notwithstanding that the states are, by such contracts, deprived 
of the exercise of one of the powers of sovereignty. And 
the majority of the cases in which the principle established in 
New Jersey vs. "Wilson has been affirmed have been cases 
where corporate charters providing for exemption from taxa-
tion have been drawn in question. In one of these cases it is 
said that" attempted state taxation is the mode most frequently 
adopted to affect contracts contrary to the constitutional inhi-
bition. It most frequently calls for the exercise of our super-
visory power."* · 
And this supervisory power the court has steadily exercised 
to declare void all state legislation impairing contracts of 
exemption made with corpo~ations in their charters. Not-
withstanding the earnest opposition and protests of the 
minority of the court, at all times, the majority has not failed 
to protect the contract of exemption when the provisions of 
the charter clearly expressed it. And one of the minority 
has not hesitated to say that the court has been "at times 
quick to discover a contract, that it might be protected, and 
slow to perceive that what are claimed to be contracts were not 
so, by reason of the want of authority in those who profess to 
bind others. This has been especially apparent i~ regard to 
contracts made by legislatures of states, and by those municipal 
* Murray vs. Charleston, 96 U. 8. 432. 
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bodies to whom, in a limited measure, some part of the legis-
lative function has been confided."*
It is believed to be the general opinion of the profession
that if the question whether a state legislature can release the
sovereign power of taxation were res integra, it would be
decided in the negative by every judicial tribunal, state and
federal. Discriminations in respect to taxation, favorable to
corporations, originally granted in conformity with the public
sentiment, which, as has been said, encouraged them by
favoring legislation, are now seen to be unwise and un-
necessary. The time when corporations need such support or
encouragement long ago passed away. The public, which
once looked with favor upon their privileges, is now alarmed by
their encroachments, and the profession and the public alike
realize the consequences of the doctrine, that under the
decision of the Dartmouth College case the essential sovereign
powers of a state relating to revenue, which ought to be
most sacredly guarded and conserved, may be bartered away
in favor of corporations, whose influence upon legislation has
been almost irresistible, and whose privileges have been often
secured by the exercise of "the sly and stealthy arts to which
state legislatures are exposed, and the greedy appetites of
adventurers for monopolies and immunities from the state
right of government."! If the Dartmouth College case had
* Miller, J., in Washington University vs. Rouse, 8 Wall. 442.
t Since the above was written, the decision in Given vs. Wright, 117
U. S. 648, has been announced, affirming anew the case of New Jersey vs.
Wilson, and bringing to notice the singular fact, that the exemption sus-
tained in that case, originally granted to the Delaware Indians, which
passed to the purchasers of their lands, was not insisted upon by the
holders of the lands, and taxes were paid for the whole period of about
sixty years since the original decision. Given vs. Wright decides that the
long acquiescence of the land-owners under the imposition of taxes,
raised a presumption that the exemption which once existed had been
surrendered, as it was a franchise or privilege which could be lost by
acquiescence. The court expresses the opinion that if the question in






































































































































bodies to whom, in a limited measure, some part of the legis-
lative function has been confided."* 
It is believed to be the general opinion of the profession 
that if the question whether a state legislature can release the 
sovereign power of taxation were res integra, it would be 
decided in the negative by every judicial tribunal, state and 
federal. Discriminations in respect to taxation, favorable to 
corporations, originally granted in conformity with the public 
sentiment, which, as has been said, encouraged them by 
favoring legislation, are now seen to be unwise and un-
necessary. The time when corporations need such support or 
encouragement long ago passed away. The public, which 
once looked with favor upon their privileges, is now alarmed by 
their encroachments, and the profession and the public alike 
realize the consequences of the doctrine, that under the 
decision of the Dartmouth College case the essential sovereign 
powers of a state relating to revenue, which ought to be 
most sacredly guarded and conserved, may be bartered away 
in favor of corporations, whose influence upon legislation has 
been almost irresistible, and whose privileges have been often 
secured by the exercise of "the sly and stealthy arts to which 
state legislatures are exposed, and the greedy appetites of 
adventurers for monopolies and immunities from the state 
right of government."t If the Dartmouth College case had 
*Miller, J., in Washington University vs. Rouse, 8 Wall. 442. 
t Since the above was written, the decision in Given vs. Wright, 117 
U.S. 648, has been announced, affirming anew the case of New Jersey vs. 
Wilson, and bringing to notice the singular fact, that the exemption sus-
tained in that case, originally granted to the Delaware Indians, which 
passed to the purchasers of their lands, was not insisted upon by the 
holders of the lands, and taxes were paid for the whole period of about 
sixty years since the original decision. Given vs. Wright decides that the 
long acquiescence of the land-owners under the imposition of taxes, 
raised a presumption that the exemption which once existed had been 
surrendered, as it was a franchise or privilege which could be lost by 
acquiescence. The court expresses the opinion that if the question in 
New Jersey tl8, Wilt1on were a new one, it might be differently decided. 
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been nothing more to corporations than the basis of their pro-
tection against taxation, it wCuld~haTe~<ieserved, even then, as
the principle has been actually applied, the protests found in
the dissenting opinions of the judges, the criticism of the
profession and the complaints of the people.
II. Here, then, we have the established principles, resting
upon the Dartmouth College case, under which corporations
have complete protection for their corporate rights and fran-
chises, the title and use of corporate property, immunities
and exemptions in respect to taxation, safety from any alter-
ation or impairment of the rights and the proprietary condi-
tion secured by their charters. These are the direct results
of that decision. But it is also the foundation upon which
private business corporations in this country are grounded,
for injurious~'as well as beneficent purposes. Under it they
have found a position from which they are enabled to deliver
the heavy fire, and carrry on the noxious warfare, of cor-
porate abuses and injustice. It is the shelter under which
the vast capital embarked in corporate business may be
employed not only in serving the people but in oppressing
them. The connection between this state of things and the
decision may be traced by the simple inquiry, what would
have been the condition of private corporations if the decision
had not been made? The answer is, that they would have
remained subject to complete~Iegislative supervision and con-
trol. If this is desirable it would seem that it can only be
brought about now by retracing the path in which the Dart-
mouth College case was the first step. Whether it is desirable
or not there is a difference of opinion; whether it is likely to
be accomplished is still more doubtful. But that the decision,
strong and fixed in our jurisprudence by repeated affirma-
tions, venerable and by many regarded with a veneration
which stigmatizes as profane any criticism of its principles,
stands, until explicitly reversed, in the way of the complete
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upon the Dartmouth College case, under which corporations 
have complete protection for their corporate rights and fran-
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have found a position from which they are enabled to deliver 
the heavy fire, and carrry on the noxious warfare, of cor-
porate abuses and injustice. It is the shelter under which 
the vast capital embarked in corporate business may be 
employed not only in serving the people but in oppressing 
them. The connection between this state of things and the 
decision may be traced by the simple inquiry, what would 
have been the condition of private corporations if the decision 
had not been made? The answer is, that they would Jiave 
remained subject to completeieglsTafive ·supervision and cori-
trQI~ _  If this is desirable it would seem -that it can only.be 
brought about now by retracing the path in which the Dart-
mouth College case was the first step. Whether it is desirable 
or not there is a difference of opinion; whether it is likely to 
be accomplished is still more doubtful. But that the decision, 
strong and fixed in our jurisprudence by repeated affirma-
tions, venerable and by many regarded with a veneration 
which stigmatizes as profane any criticism of its principles, 
stands, until explicitly reversed, in the way of the complete 
legislative restraint of corporations, is certain. 
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It is indisputable, therefore, that the beneficial results of
the decision to private corporations have been inestimable. It
has secured to them, beyond recall, enormous privileges and
powers. It is the corner-stone of a structure of corporate
wealth and influence, which has been broadening and rising
higher with every succeeding year. It has encouraged them
in independence of the legislative and popular will, and offers to
them a constant temptation to wield their vast resources solely
for their own aggrandizement. It forbids legislation, however
desirable, which is often essential to the public welfare. All
this may be fairly said without partaking of a spirit of unrea-
soning hostility to corporations. The criticism of the original
decision which asserts that it has been the source of such
priceless benefits to corporations is rational and just. No
judicial mind could have anticipated, at the time of the de-
cision, the extent of subsequent applications of a principle
declared in the case of a college to business corporations, any
more than the extensive and varied growth of corporations
could have been foreseen. But, from the beginning, the
application of the rule to the charters of business corporations
has been asserted and defended as necessary to stimulate Cor-
porate enterprise and investments.* However this may have
been, it is certain that there is some foundation for professional
and public opinion that the principle of the leading case has
been pressed too far in the courts; that not only has reason-
able encouragement been afforded to corporate exertion, but
that it has emboldened corporations in independence, in inva-
sions of public right and in abuses of their lawful powers.
III. The larger part of professional and lay criticism upon
the Dartmouth College case and its results has been directed
against the Supreme Court, asserting that the principle has
been pressed too far, to the advantage of corporations and the
protection of vested interests; that it has "been made to
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. the decision to private corporations have been inestimable. It 
has secured to them, beyond recall, enormous privileges and 
powers. It is the corner-stone of a structure of corporate 
wealth and influence,"which has been broadening and rising 
higher with every succeeding year. It has encouraged them 
in independence of the legislative and popular will, and offers to 
them a constant temptation to wield their vast resources solely 
for their own aggrandizement. It forbids legislation, however 
desirable, which is often essential to the public welfare. All 
this may be fairly said without partaking of a spirit of unrea-
soning hostility to corporations. The criticism of the original 
decision which asserts that it has been the source of such 
priceless benefits to corporations is rational and just. No 
j:;;dicial mind could have anticipated, at the time of the de-
cision, the extent of subsequent applications of a principle 
declared in the case of a college to business corporations, any 
more than the extensive and varied growth of corporations 
could have been foreseen. But, from the beginning, the 
application of the rule to the charters of business corporations 
has been asserted and defended as necessary to stimulate cor-
porate enterprise and investments.* However this may have 
been, it is certain that there is some foundation for professional 
and public opinion that the principle of the leading case has 
been pressed too far in the courts ; that not only has reason-
able encouragement been afforded to corporate exertion, but 
that it has emboldened corporations in independence, in inva-
sions of public right and in abuses of their lawful powers. 
III. The larger part of professional and lay criticism upon 
the Dartmouth College case and its results has been directed 
against the Supreme Court, asserting that the principle has 
been pressed too far, to the advantage of corporations and the 
protection of vested interests; that it has "been made to 
*The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 74. 
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sustain grants which neither law nor justice nor sound prin-
ciple can sanction;" that "the rule in that case has been
perverted to the maintenance of corporate institutions invested
with great public functions."* This is apart from the question
of the soundness of the original decision, which has been
repeatedly challenged and discussed with great research and
ability,f but which is not within the purpose of this paper.
In estimating the force and justice of such animadversions,
it is necessary to consider the principal case and the later
decisions founded upon it, and the course of decision in the
Supreme Court alone, regarded as a body or system of legal
doctrine. Of this the constituents are:
(1) The principle that the charter of a private corporation
is a contract. The court has firmly and steadily applied this
principle in cases of business corporations, and whenever the
contract has been found in the charter it has been protected
from impairment or violation, and legislation to that effect has
been held invalid. Thus business corporations have been
secured in the possession and enjoyment of every privilege,
exemption and benefit clearly conferred by charters; in the
irrevocable title to property and franchises granted; in the
exclusion of competing corporate enterprises and works; in
freedom from increased public burdens; in the right to the
use and enjoyment of their property and franchises; in im-
munity from legislative control.J And the court has never
* See, as representative of such criticism, a very interesting and able
address by Hon. John A. Jameson, of Chicago, before the Illinois State
Bar Association, January 6, 1882, upon " Interference by Law with the
Accumulation and Use of Capital."
t See especially "The Dartmouth College Case," vol. viii., American
Law Beview, p. 189, January, 1874, and Mr. Shirley's volume, "The
Dartmouth College Causes and the Supreme Court of the United States,"
St. Louis, 1879.
X Planters' Bank vs. Sharp, 6 How. 301; Trustees of Vincennes Univ.
vs. Indiana, 14 How. 268; The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 73; Davis vs.
Gray, 16 Wall. 203; New Jersey vs. Yard, 95 U. S. 104; New Orleans







































































































































sustain grants which neither law nor justice nor sound prin-
ciple can sanction; " that " the rule in that case has been 
perverted to the maintenance of corporate institutions invested 
with great public functions."* This is apart from the question 
of the soundness of the original decision, which has been 
repeatedly challenged and discussed with great research and 
ability, t but which is not within the purpose of this paper. 
In estimating the force and justice of such animadversions, 
it is necessary to consider the principal case and the later 
decisions founded upon it, and the course of decision in the 
SuPfeme Court alone, regarded as a body or system of legal 
doctrine. Of this the constituents are : 
(1) The principle that the charter of a private corporation 
is a contract. The court has firmly and steadily applied this 
principle in cases of business corporations, and whenever the 
contract has been found in the charter it has been protected 
from impairment or violation, and legislation to that effect has 
been held invalid. Thus business corporations have been 
secured in the possession and enjoyment of every privilege, 
exemption and benefit clearly conferred by charters ; in the 
irrevocable title to property and franchises granted; in the 
exclusion of competing corporate enterprises and works; in 
freedom from increased public burdens; in the right to the 
use and enjoyment of their property and franchises ; in im-
munity from legislative control.! And the court has never 
*See, as representative of such criticism, a very interesting and able 
addreRs by Hon. John A. Jameson, of Chicago, before the Illinois State 
Bar Association, January 6, 1882, upon "Interference by Law with the 
Accumulation and Use of Capital." 
t See especially " The Dartmouth College Case," vol. viii., American 
Law Review, p. 189, January, 187 4, and Mr. Shirley's volume, "The 
Dartmouth College Causes and the Supreme Court of the United States," 
St. Louis, 1879. 
t Planters' Bank vs. Sharp, 6 How. 301; Trustees of Vincennes Univ. 
vs. Indiana, 14 How. 268; The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 73; Davis vs. 
Gray, 16 Wall. 203; New Jersey vs. Yard, 95 U.S. 104; New Orleans 
Gas and Water Cases, 115 U. S. 650; and the whole series of taxation 
cases, cited supra. 
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failed to declare its adherence to the principal case and the
improbability of its reversal in the most explicit terms, thus,
"The principles they maintain are now axiomatic in American
jurisprudence."* Again, "The question decided in that [the
Dartmouth College] case has since been considered as finally
settled in the jurisprudence of the entire country. Murmurs
of doubt and dissatisfaction are occasionally heard, but there
has been no re-argument here and none has been asked for."f
And again, it is said that the courts "are estopped from ques-
tioning the doctrine."^ Again, "The doctrines * * an-
nounced by this court more than sixty years ago have become
so imbedded in the jurisprudence of the United States as to
make them to all intents and purposes a part of the constitution
itself."§
The legal profession will not readily unite in support of a
demand, however urgently it may be pressed by popular opin-
ion, that the Supreme Court shall reverse the original decision.
Every sanction which establishes the maxim, stare decisis,
forbids this. It was made upon the greatest deliberation.
The authority of the greatest names in our judicial annals
supports it. Their successors, through a period of more than
sixty-five years, have affirmed and followed it. Whether
right or wrong, it is now too late to overthrow it. Vested
interests and rights, the investments of millions, great and
beneficent works and enterprises depend upon its permanence.
The language of Mr. Justice Davis is not too strong when he
says that ||" the security of property rests upon it, and every
successful enterprise is undertaken in the unshaken belief that
it will never be forsaken. A departure from it now would
involve dangers to society not to be foreseen, would shock the
sense of justice of the country, and weaken if not destroy
* Von Hoffman vs. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535.
f Farrington vs. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 685.
j The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 73.
I Stone vs. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 816.
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forbids this. It was made upon the greatest deliberation. 
The authority of the greatest names in our judicial annals 
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II The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 73. 
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that respect which has always been felt for the judicial de-
partment of the government." It is often said that every
persistent popular demand finally obtains what it desires, even
from the judicial tribunals. But there is little ground for the
expectation that this case will be reversed under any conceiv-
able pressure of public sentiment. It will continue to be the
subject of adverse criticism, which will be intensified and
strengthened, in the profession and outside of it, unless cor-
porate abuses are restrained or come to an end. But the
remedies for these, it is believed, will be found in some other
way than in the reversal, by the court itself, of this memorable
judgment.
(2) Although the leading case has thus been repeatedly
affirmed and declared to be unassailable, we find it qualified
and limited by important adjudications which have established
principles operating in a high degree to confine and lessen
its effect in encouraging the independence and aggressions of
corporations. When it became settled that grants to them
were not to be extended by construction, and that all charters
were to be construed strictly against the grantees,* whatever
criticism may be made upon the doctrine or its consistency
with the Dartmouth College case, it is certain that a check
was thereby laid upon the effect of the principal decision, i
And the rule established in the Charles River Bridge case has
been repeatedly afiirmed and stands as firmly as the rule that
a charter is a contract. This principle has been steadily
applied where corporations have invoked the protection of the
constitutional inhibition, under charters which contained no
clear contract, and in administering the rule the Supreme
Court has denied the claims of many corporations to the ex-
clusive privileges, beneficial exemptions and valuable grants
♦Charles River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420; Richmond
R. R. Co. vs. Louisa R. R. Co., 13 How. 71; Perrine vs. Canal Co., 9 How.
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able pressure of public sentiment. It will continue to be the 
subject of adverse criticism, which will be intensified and 
strengthened, in the profession and outside of it, unless cor-
porate abuses are restrained or come to an end. But the 
remedies for these, it is believed, will be found in some other 
way than in the reversal, by the court itself, of this memorable 
.judgment. 
(2) Although the leading case has thus been repeatedly 
affirmed and declared to be unassailable, we find it qualified 
and limited by important adjudications which have established 
principles operating in a high degree to confine and lessen 
its effect in encouraging the independence and aggressions of 
corporations. When it became settled that grants to them 
were not to be extended by construction, and that all charters 
were to be construed strictly against the grantees,* whatever 
criticism may be made upon the doctrine or its consistency 
with the Dartmouth College case, it is certain that a check 
was thereby laid upon the effect of the principal decision. , 
And the rule established in the Charles River Bridge case has 
been repeatedly affirmed and stands as firmly as the rule that 
a charter is a contract. This principle has been steadily 
applied where corporations have invoked the protection of the 
constitutional inhibition, under charters which contained no 
clear contract, and in administering the rule the Supreme 
Court has denied the claims of many corporations to the ex-
clusive privileges, beneficial exemptions and valuable grants 
* Charles River Bridge i•s. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420; Richmond 
R. R. Co. vs. Louisa R. R. Co., 13 How. 71; Perrine vs. Canal Co., 9 How. 
172; Turnpike Co. vs. State, 3 Wall. 210; Ruggles vs. Illinois, 108 U.S. 
526. 
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asserted under charters. Under this principle corporations
have been apprised that the securing of a loosely-drawn charter
was not enough to confer upon them all the rights and privi-
leges expected, that charters convey nothing by implication,*
and that they are always subject to the scrutiny of the judicial
power, under a rule of strict construction. The effect of such
adjudications upon charter legislation has undoubtedly been
beneficial. It has made legislatures aware that if it was
intended to confer an irrevocable franchise, privilege or ex-
emption, that purpose must be clearly expressed. Many a
legislature, brought face to face with an explicit charter-
contract, would hesitate to enact it, while a skillfully drawn
charter, intended by its promoters to contain but not express
a contract, might pass unchallenged. Thus, this important
rule of the construction of charters, in its actual application,
has been favorable to the public as against corporations.
(3) The Supreme Court has asserted and upheld the legis-
lative authority over corporations in all cases where their
charters, or the general laws, or the provisions of state
* Especially in the taxation cases the court has held that the contract
must be clearly expressed in the charter. Providence Bank vs. Billings, 4
Pet. 514; Salt Co. vs. East Saginaw, 13 Wall. 373; The Delaware R. R.
Tax Cases, 18 Wall. 225; Tucker vs. Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527; New Jersey
vs. Yard, 95 U. S. 104; Hoge vs. R. R. Co., 99 U. S. 348; Railway Co. vs.
Philadelphia, 101 U. S. 539; Memphis Gas Light Co. vs. Shelby Tax
District, 109 U. S. 398; Southwest. R. R. Co. vs. Wright, 116 U. S. 231,';
Vicksburg, etc., R. R. Co. vs. Dennis, 116 U. S. 668 ; Tennessee s. Whit-
worth, 117 U. S. 139-148. And the privilege of exemption from taxation
is construed to be the special privilege of the corporation to which it is
granted, and does not pass to its successor unless the law granting the ex-
emption expresses a clear intent to that effect. Morgan vs. Louisiana, 93
U. S. 217; Wilson vs. Gaines, 103 U. S. 417; Louisville & Nashville R. R.
Co. vs. Palmes, 109 U. S. 244; Memphis R. R. Co. vs. Commissioners, 112
U. S. 609. And exemptions from taxation which are mere bounties, or
privileges granted without consideration, may be withdrawn or repealed
by the legislature. Rector, etc., us Philadelphia, 24 How. 301; Tucker lis.
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Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527; West Wi'lconsin vs. Board of Supervisors, 93 
u. s. 595. 
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constitutions reserved to the legislature the power of amendment
or repeal. This means of retaining the control of corporate
charters, and of avoiding "the unalterable and irrepealable
character of the contract," has been in force since the decision
of the principal case, and a suggestion by Judge Story to that
effect in his opinion was immediately followed, and many of
the states, availing themselves of this mode of action, have
maintained a supervision of corporations which has been
effectivcin a high degree. The court has never failed to give
the state and the public the benefit of this principle, whenever
the charter, or general law, or the state constitution has
reserved the power. In a multitude of cases, corporations
have been denied the privileges asserted under charters claimed
to be irrepealable, and have been subjected to the efficient
action of the legislative power.*
As the power to amend and repeal charters would be ample
in the state legislatures, in the absence of the provision of the
federal constitution forbidding the impairment of the obligation
of contracts, such a reservation leaves a state where any
sovereignty would be, if unrestrained by express constitutional
limitations. Whenever the power is reserved, it may be
exercised to amend the charter to almost any extent to carry
into effect the original purposes of the corporate organization
and secure due administration of its affairs, or to repeal the
charter altogether, so as to terminate absolutely the existence
of the corporation by the abrogation of "the organic law on
which the corporate existence depends, "f But the exercise of
the power of amendment or repeal cannot deprive corporations
of their rights or property acquired by the use of their
* Pennsylvania College Cases, 13 Wall. 213; Miller vs. State, 15 Wall.
478; Tomlinson vs. Jessup, 15 Wall. 454; Shields vs. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319;
Railway Co. vs. Maine, 96 U. S. 499; Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700.
Railway Co. vs. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359; Railway vs. Philadelphia, 101
U. S. 539; Greenwood vs. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13; Spring Valley Water
Works vs. Schottler, 110 U. S. 348.
t Miller vs. State, 15 Wall. 478; Shields vs. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319; Green-






































































































































constitutions reserved to the legislature the power of amendment 
or repeal. This means of retaining the control of corporate 
charters, and of avoiding "the unalterable and irrepealable 
character of the contract," has been in force since the decision 
of the principal case, and a suggestion by Judge Story to ,that 
effect in his opinion was immediately followed, and many of 
the states, availing themselves of this mode of action, have 
maintained a supervision of corporations which has been 
effective1in a high degree. The court has never failed to give 
the state and the public the benefit of this principle, whenever 
the charter, or general law, or the state constitution has 
reserved the power. In a multitude of cases, corporations 
have been denied the privileges asserted under charters claimed 
to be irrepealable, and have been subjected to the efficient 
action of the legislative power.* 
As the power to amend and repeal charters would be ample 
in the state legislatures, in the absence of the provision of the 
federal constitution forbidding the impairment of the obligation 
of contracts, such a reservation leaves a state where any 
sovereignty would be, if unrestrained by express constitutional 
limitations. 'Vhenever the power is reserved, it may be 
exercised to amend the charter to· almost any extent to carry 
into effect the original purposes of the corporate organization 
and secure due administration of its affairs, or to repeal the 
charter altogether, so as to terminate absolutely the existence 
of the corporation by the abrogation of "the organic law on 
which the corporate existence depends. "t But the exercise of 
the power of amendment or repeal cannot deprive corporations 
of their rights or property acquired by the use of their 
*Pennsylvania College Cases, 13 Wall. 213; Miller VB. State, 15 Wall. 
478; Tomlinson va. Jessup, 15 Wall. 454; Shields w. Ohio, 95 U.S. 319; 
Railway Co. VB. Maine, 96 U.S. 499; Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700. 
Railway Co. VB. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359; Railway vs. Philadelphia, 101 
U.S. 539; Greenwood VB. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13; Spring Valley Water 
Works VB. Schottler, 110 U.S. 348. 
t Miller VB. State, 15 Wall. 478; Shields VB. Ohio, 95 U.S. 319; Green· 
wood VB. Freight Co., 105 U.S. 19. 
19
franchises.* Thus the rights of shareholders and creditors are
protected. So that the reserved power of amendment or repeal
is not unlimited, or destructive, or violative of vested rights.
To those whose indulgence in complaint of the encroach-
ments of corporations is somewhat sweeping, it may be fairly sug-
gested that the actual and practical operation of this reserved
legislative power is a restraint upon corporations much more
effectual than they are willing to acknowledge. The inquiry
by statistics is difficult, but we venture the statement that the
larger number of corporations existing in this country come
under legislative control by virtue of provisions in their
charters, or in the general laws or constitutions of the
states. In the majority of the states, constitutional provisions
forbid the granting of charters, except with a reservation of
the power of amendment or repeal. The day of special char-
ters is past. General laws, for the most part, are the basis
of corporate organization. The present tendency of legisla-
tion is not, to say the least, favorable to corporations. And
in estimating the necessity for more severe legislative action
concerning them, the extent of the^present control of them,
under the reserved power, should not be under-estimated.
And certainly, any criticism upon the effect of the Dart-
mouth College case, as encouraging corporate independence,
should not leave out of view the consistent maintenance of this
power by the Supreme Court.
(4) It is well settled that the legislature may exercise the
power of eminent domain, to authorize the taking of the
property of corporations, including their franchises, upon due
compensation.f This principle places the most valuable and
exclusive rights and franchises of corporations under legislative
control, whenever the public interest appears to the legislature
* Miller vs. State, 15 Wall. 478; Shields vs. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319; Green-
wood vs. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 19.
t West River Bridge Co. vs. Dix, 6 How. 507; Richmond, etc., R. R.
Co. vs. Louisa R. R. Co., 13 How. 71; Greenwood vs. Freight Co., 105 U.






































































































































franchises.* Thus the rights of shareholders and creditors are 
protected. So that the reserved power of amendment or repeal 
is not unlimited, or destructive, or violative of vested rights. 
To those whose indulgence in complaint of the encroach-
ments of corporations is somewhat sweeping, it may be fairly sug-
gested that the actual and practical operation of this reserved 
legislative power is a restraint upon corporations much more 
effectual than they are willing to acknowledge. The inquiry 
by statistics is difficult, but we venture the statement that the 
larger number of corporations existing in this country come 
under legislative control by virtue of provisions in their 
charters, or in the general laws or constitutions of the 
states. In the majority of the states, constitutional provisions 
forbid the granting of charters, except with a reservation of 
the power of amendment or repeal. The day of special char-
ters is past. General laws, for the most part, are the basis 
-0f corporate organization. The present tendency of legisla-
,; tion is not, to say the l~~-f~y_Q!a~le t~_ ~()r~~_!l:~i?ns. And 
in estimating thelieCe8sity for more severe legislative action 
concerning them, the extent of the:present control of them, 
under the reserved power, should not be under-estimated. 
And certainly, any criticism upon the effect of the Dart-
mouth College case, as encouraging corporate independence, 
should not leave out of view the consistent maintenance of this 
power by the Supreme Court. 
( 4) It is well settled that the legislature may exercise the 
power of eminent domain, to authorize the taking of the 
property of corporations, including their franchises, upon due 
compensation. t This principle places the most valuable and 
exclusive rights and franchises of corporations under legislative 
control, whenever the public interest appears to the legislature 
*Miller w. State, 15 Wall. 478 ; Shields VB. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319; Green-
wood VB. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 19. 
t West River Bridge Co. vs. Dix, 6 How. 507; Richmond, etc., R.R. 
Co. VB. Louisa R.R. Co., 13 How. 71; Greenwood v1. Freight Co., 105 U. 
S. 22; New Orleans Gas Light Co. vs. Louisiana, etc., Co., 115 U.S. 650. 
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to require that new corporations should be organized, and the
constantly developing Necessities of growing and progressive
communities aided by new corporate undertakings. The prac-
tical operation of this principle is to keep the limits- of the
field of corporate exertion under the constant supervision
of legislation, and to leave to the determination of the
representatives of the people the question whether that field
should be enlarged or restricted at any particular period.
This end is subserved, and corporations which have acquired
vested rights and interests receive just compensation for what-
ever is taken from them.
(5) The most important adjudications which form a part of
the system of doctrine founded on the Dartmouth College case,
are the comparatively recent decisions which sustained the
exercise of the supervisory and controlling power of the legis-
lature in the "Warehouse " and " Granger" cases, so denomi-
nated. These have provoked wide discussion and earnest
criticism. They have been assailed by many in the profession;
they were accompanied by strong dissent on the part of the
minority of the court; they have been hailed with approval
and congratulation in large sections of the country where
public sentiment was most vigorous in antagonism to corpora-
tions; they have been regarded by many, in and out of the
profession, as inconsistent in reasoning and principle with
the leading case, as indicating a tendency in the court to re-
view and reverse it, and as presaging its final abandonment
and overthrow.
These cases were as follows:
In Munn vs. Illinois,* the question was as to the power of
the legislature of Illinois to fix by law the maximum of charges
for the storage of grain in warehouses, at Chicago and other
places in the state having not less than one hundred thousand
inhabitants, and to require persons doing business as private






































































































































to require that new corporations should be organized, and the 
constantly developing ~ecessities of growing and progressive 
communities aided by new corporate undertakings. The prac-
tical operation of this principle is to keep the limits- of the 
field of corporate exertion under the constant supervision 
of legislation, and to leave to the determination of the 
representatives of the people the question whether that field 
should be enlarged or restricted at any particular period. 
'rhis end is subserved, and corporations which have acquired 
vested rights and interests receive just compensation for what-
ever is taken from them. 
(5) The most important adjudications which form a part of 
the system of doctrine founded on the Dartmouth College case, 
are the comparatively recent decisions which sustained the 
exercise of the supervisory and controlling power of the legis-
lature in the "Warehouse " and " Granger " cases, so denomi-
nated. These have provoked wide discussion and earnest 
criticism. They have been assailed by rpaily in the profession; 
they were accompanied by strong dissent on the part of the 
minority of the court; they have been hailed with approval 
and congratulation in large sections of the country where 
public sentiment was most vigorous in antagonism to corpora-
tions; they have been regarded by many, in and out of the 
profession, as inconsistent in reasoning and principle with 
the leading case, as indicating a tendency in the court to re-
view and reverse it, and as presaging its final abandonment 
and overthrow. 
These cases were as follows : 
In Munn vs. Illinois,* the question was as to the power of 
the legislature of Illinois to fix by law the maximum of charges 
for the storage of grain in warehouses, at Chicago and other 
places in the state having not less than one hundred thousand 
inhabitants, and to require persons doing business as private 
*94 u. s. 113. 
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warehousemen to take out a license for such business, and to
declare the business to be that of public warehousemen. The
constitutionality of such legislation was sustained, and it was
held that "where private property is devoted to a public use
it is subject to public regulation;" that "property does become
clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make
it of public consequence and affect the community at large.
When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which
the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an
interest in that use and must submit to be controlled by the
public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he
has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discon-
tinuing the use, but so long as he maintains the use he must
submit to the control."
The "Granger Cases "* involved a consideration of the
charters of different railroad companies and the extent of the
power of the legislature in the regulation of their charges, as well
in the absence of any reservation of a right to alter or repeal
them, as where such reservation was embodied in the charters
or in the constitutions or laws under which they were granted.
These cases decided that railroads are subject to the super-
vision and control of the legislature, like all carriers at com-
mon law, being engaged in a public employment affecting the
public interest, and, therefore, under the decision of Munn vs.
Illinois, subject to legislation as to their rates of fare and
freight, unless protected by their charters; that in the absence
of charter-contracts the charges by railroad companies for
services within the state may be limited by the legislature
and a maximum of charges prescribed; that where the state
constitution reserves a right of amendment or repeal, the
legislature may prescribe a maximum, although the charter
•Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. vs. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Peik
vs. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., Ibid. 164; Chicago, Milwaukee,
& St. Paul R. R. Co. vs. Ackley, Ibid. 179; Winona & St. Peter R. R.
Co. «8. Blake, Ibid. 180; Stone vs. Wisconsin, Ibid. 181; Ruggles vs.






































































































































warehousemen to take out a license for such business, and to 
declare the business to be that of public warehousemen. The 
constitutionality of such legislation was sustained, and it was 
held that "where private property is devoted to a public use 
it is subject to public regulation;" that "property does become 
clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make 
it of' public consequence and affect the community at large. 
When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which 
the public has an interest, he, in eftect, grants to the public an 
interest in that use and must submit to be controlled by the 
public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he 
has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discon-
tinuing the use, but so long as he maintains the use he must 
submit to the control." 
The "Granger Cases"* involved a consideratiqn of the 
charters of different railroad companies and the extent of the 
power of the legislature in the regulation of their charges, as well 
in the absence of any reservation of a right to alter or repeal 
them, as ·where such reservation was embodied in the charters 
or in the constitutions or laws under which they were granted. 
These cases decided that railroads are subject to the super-
vision and control of the legislature, like all carriers at com-
mon law, being engaged in a public employment affecting the 
public interest, and, therefore, under the decision of Munn vs. 
Illinois, subject to legislation as to their rates of far~ and 
freight, unles~ protected by their charters; that in the absence 
of charter-contracts the charges by railroad companies for 
services within the state may be limited by the legislature 
and a maximum of charges prescribed; that where the state 
constitution reserves a right of amendment or repeal, the 
legislature may prescribe a maximum, although the charter 
*Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. vs. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155; Peik 
tis. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., Ibid. 164; Chicago, Milwaukee, 
& St. Paul R. R. Co. vs. Ackley, nW. li9; Winona & St. Peter R. R. 
Co. t1s. Blake, Ibid. 180; Stone i·s. Wisconsin, Ibid. 181 ; Ruggles vs. 
Illinois, 108 U. S. 526. 
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authorizes such charges as are reasonable; that more than the
maximum fixed by the legislature cannot be recovered by the
company by showing that the amount charged was no more
than reasonable for the services.
Taken together, these decisions assert the complete power
of legislative regulation, whenever the business of the corpora-
tion is of such a nature, in the judgment of the court, as to
affect the public interest.
The "Railroad Commission Cases,"* decided at the last
term of the court, affirm the "Granger Cases" and go
beyond them, sustaining the validity of a statute regulating
rates of transportation and creating a state board of commis-
sioners to supervise and enforce the same. The court holds
that the creation of such a board does not violate the charter
right of the corporation to manage its affairs through its own
directors; that statutes regulating rates of charges do not
deprive corporations of their property without due process of
law; but it is declared that the power of regulation is not a
power to destroy, that limitation is not equivalent to confisca-
tion, and that under pretence of regulating charges, the state
could not require a corporation to carry without reward nor
do that which amounts in law to taking private property for
public use without just compensation or due process of law.
As no tariff of charges had been fixed by the commission in
question, the court declines to say what action of the commis-
sion would have this effect. The power of regulation is
declared to be one which cannot be bargained away without
express grant. Justices Harlan and Field, dissenting, regard
the statute in question as one impairing the charter-contract
with the company and their right under the charter to fix
their own charges and manage their own affairs through their
own directors, officers and agents, though they concede that
statutes may be valid establishing railroad commissions for
many purposes.






































































































































authorizes such charges as are reasonable ; that more than the 
maximum fixed by the legislature cannot be recovered by the 
company by showing that the amount charged was no more 
than reasonable for the servic~s. 
Taken together, these decisions assert the complete power 
of legislative regulation, whenever the business of the corpora-
tion is of such a nature, in the judgment of the court, as to 
taffect the public interest. 
\/ The "Railroad Commission Cases,"* decided at the last 
/ " \ term of the court, affirm the " Granger Cases " and go 
beyond them, sustaining the validity of a statute regulating 
rates of transportation and creating a state board of commis-
sioners to supervise and enforce the same. The court holds 
that the creation of such a board does not violate the charter 
right ofthe corporation to manage its affairs through its own 
directors ; that statutes regulating rates of charges do not 
deprive corporations of their property without due process of 
law; but it is declared that the power of regulation is not a 
power to destroy, that limitation is not equivalent to confisca-
tion, and that under pretence of regulating charges, the state 
could not require a corporation to carry without reward nor 
do that which amounts in law to taking private property for 
public use without just compensation or due process of law. 
As no tariff of charges had been fixed by the commission in 
question, the court declines to say what action of the commis-
sion would have this effect. The power of . regulation is 
declared to be one which cannot be bargained away without 
express grant. Justices Harlan and Field, dissenting, regard 
the statute in question as one impairing the charter-contract 
with the company and their right ·under the charter to fix 
their own charges and manage their own affairs through their 
own directors, officers and agents, though they concede that 
statutes may be valid establishing railroad commissions for 
many purposes. 
y,.. * 116 u. s. 307 . 
. / .." 
These decisions assert principles which have not received,
and, as we believe, cannot receive, the assent of the most
weighty professional opinion. The reasoning of the dissent-
ing opinions seems to us to be unanswerable. These express,
with cogent logic, abundant authority and masterly strength,
the consequences of a doctrine that the legislative power can
be unchecked, in its interference with business essentially
private, or its prescription of the compensation which private
and corporate owners shall receive for the use of their pro-
perty. Without such decisions, all the rights of regulation of
the use of property, and to prevent its abuse to the injury of
the public, and for the protection of the public interest, can
be effectually preserved, in all cases where special privileges
are granted, under settled principles as to the exercise of the
police power. To state the reasons of our conviction would
be only to repeat the larger portions of the dissenting opin-
ions. The decisions seem to us to be "subversive of the
rights of private property, heretofore believed to be protected
by constitutional guaranties against legislative interference;"
they hold that "all property and all business of the state are
held at the mercy of the legislature;" they deprive private
and corporate owners of their property absolutely, although
under the guise of mere regulations as to its use and employ-
ment and non-interference with its title and possession. It
seems indisputable that "If the legislature of a state under
pretence of providing for the public good, or for any other
reason, can determine, against the consent of the owner, the
uses to which private property shall be devoted, or the prices
which the owner shall receive for its uses, it can deprive him
of the property as completely as by a special act for its con-
fiscation or destruction." "There is, indeed, no protection
of any value, under the constitutional provision, which does
not extend to the use and income of the property, as well as
to its title and possession."
It is difficult to resist the conviction that the court, in






































































































































These decisions assert principles which have not received, 
and, as we believe, cannot receive, the assent of the most 
weighty professional opinion. 1he reasoning of the dissent-
ing opinions seems to us to be unanswerable. These express, 
with cogent logic, abundant authority and masterly strength, 
the consequences of a doctrine that the legislative power can 
be unchecked, in its interference with business essentially 
private, or its prescription of the compensation which private 
and corporate owners shall receive for the use of their pro--
perty. Without such decisions, all the rights of regulation of 
the use of property, and to prevent its abuse to the injury of 
the public, and for the protection,of the public interest, can 
be effectually preserved, in all cases where special privileges 
are granted, under settled principles as to the exercise of the 
police power. To state the reasons of our conviction would 
be only to repeat the larger portions of the dissenting opin-
ions. The decisions seem to us to be " subversive of the 
rights of private property, heretofore believed to be protected 
by constitutional guaranties against legislative interference ( 
they hold that " all property and all business of the state are 
held at the mercy of the legislature;" they deprive private 
and corporate owners of their property absolutely, although 
under the guise of mere regulations as to its use and employ-
ment and non-interference with its title and possession. It 
seems indisputable that "If the legislature of a state under 
pretence of providing for the public good, or for any other 
reason, can determine, against the consent of the owner, the 
uses to which private property shall be devoted, or the prices 
which the owner shall receive for its uses, it can deprive him 
of the property as completely as by a special act for its con-
fiscation or destruction." " There is, indeed, no protection 
of any value, under the constitutional provision, which does 
not extend to the use and income of the property, as well as 
to its title and possession." 
It is difficult to resist the conviction that the court, in 
deciding these, cases, was not altogether insensible to the 
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pressure of that public sentiment which prevailed at the time
—the " Granger" sentiment of the Great West.
That the principles of these decisions are inconsistent with
the reasoning of the Dartmouth College case, is maintained
in the dissenting opinions and insisted upon by professional
criticism. The question "to what purpose can the constitu-
tional prohibition upon the states, against impairing the obli-
gation of contracts, be invoked, if the state can, in the face of
a charter authorizing a company to charge reasonable rates, -
prescribe what rates shall be deemed reasonable for services
rendered," can receive, it seems to us, but one answer, viz.,
the constitutional inhibition is of no effect. It is true that
the court expressly declares its adherence to the leading
case; that it holds that the railroad charters in question con-
tained no contracts; that it considers that the College case
and the " Granger Cases," can stand together; and certainly,
so far as establishing the law is concerned, the court is the
final judge of its own consistency. But it seems to us that
the principle of these cases, that the use of property affecting
the public generally clothes it with a public interest, conflicts
with the decision that the college was a purely private cor-
poration; that the decisions tend to justify unchecked legisla-
tive control of all private corporations; that the reasoning of
the court is inconsistent with the protection of the contracts
even where the charters expressly contain them, and tends to
allow the impairment of the contracts of corporations with
third persons, especially where securities have been issued
■upon corporate property.
The legislative regulation of corporations, thus maintained,
is based upon the nature of the business carried on. The
court establishes the general principle that whenever such
business is of public consequence, and affects the community
generally, the legislative power is complete to regulate. If
individuals or corporations devote their property to uses in






































































































































pressure of that public sentiment which prevailed at the time 
-the " Granger " sentiment of the Great 'Vest. 
That the principles of these decisions are inconsistent with 
the reasoning of the Dartmouth College case, is maintained 
in the dissenting opinions and insisted upon by professional 
criticism. The question "to what purpose can the constitu-
tional prohibition upon the states, against impairing the obli-
gation of contracts, be invoked, if the state can, in the face of 
a charter authorizing a company to charge reasonable rates, ' 
prescribe what rates shall be . deemed reasonable for services 
rendered," can receive, it seems to us, but one answer, viz., 
the constitutional inhibition is of no effect. It is true that 
the court expressly declares its adherence to the leading 
case; that it holds that the railroad charters in question con-
tained no contracts ; that it considers that the . College case 
and the "Granger Cases," can stand together; and certainly, 
so far as establisP.ing t4e law is concerned, the court is the 
final judge of its own consistency. But it seems to us that 
the principle of these cases, that the use of property affecting 
the public generally clothes it with a public interest, conflicts 
with the decision that the college was a purely private cor-
poration; that the decisions tend to justify unchecked legisla-
tive control of all private corporations ; that the reasoning of 
the court is inconsistent with the protection of the contracts 
even where the charters expressly contain them, and tends to 
allow the impairment of the contracts of corporations with 
, third persons, especially where securities have been issued 
upon corporate property. 
The legislative regulation of corporations, thus maintained, 
is based upon the nature of the business carried on. The 
court establishes the general principle that whenever such 
business is of public consequence, and affects the community 
generally, the legislative power is complete to regulate. If 
individuals or corporations devote their property to uses in 





dedication of the property to public use, and an implied
submission, on the part of the owners, to legislative control or
the public good. The limits of this power of regulation, there-
fore, depend upon what the court may determine, in every
case, as to the nature of the business. These limits are unde-
fined, and although the court plants itself, professedly, upon
the principle of dedication to public use, and an implied con-
sent of the owners of the property, many regard the virtual
ground of decision to be the police power, which is generally
exercised in invitum. But the declared opinions of the court
must be accepted as to the ground of their decision. The
power of regulation is, therefore, left to the combined deter-
mination of the legislative and judicial authority as to the
nature of the business, The most recent decisions, presently
to be noticed, show that the court asserts its power to deter-
mine, in every case, what is business of a public nature, and
what is ordinary business, and when and to what extent the
police power may be exercised in respect to it. But may it
not be fairly asked, is not this power of regulation equivalent,
as thus asserted, to the power of the legislature over public
corporations, and are not corporations virtually held to be
public whenever it can be found that the business or purposes
of the corporate organization affect the community generally?
The importance of the results of these decisions, alike to
corporations and to the public, has been demonstrated in the
period which has elapsed since they were announced. Upon
the former they have had marked effect in discouraging cor-
porate investments, and have rendered corporate rights and
franchises less valuable. Whether the public has derived from
the decisions the benefit claimed for them is at least open to
question. That part of the people which is most hostile to
corporations finds, in these decisions, encouragement for the
expectation that the court will, at no distant day, reverse the
principal case, an event by which it is supposed a millenium of






































































































































dedication of the property to public use, and an implied 
submission, on the part of the owners, to legislative control or 
the public good. The limits of this power of regulation, there-
fore, depend upon what the court may determine, in every 
case, as to the n~ture of the business. These limits are unde-
fined, and although the court plants itself, professedly, upon 
the principle of dedication to public use, and an implied con-
sent of the owners of the property, many regard the virtual 
ground of decision to be the police power, which is generally 
exercised in invitum. But the declared opinions of the court 
must be accepted as to the ground of their decision. The 
power of regulation is, therefore, left to the combined deter-
mination of the legislative and judicial authority as to the 
~ature of the business. The most recent decisions, presently 
to be noticed, show that the court asserts its power to deter-
mine, in every case, what is business of a public nature, and 
what is ordinary business, and when and to what extent the 
police power may be exercised in respect to it. But may it 
not be fairly asked, is not this power of regulation equivalent, 
as thus asserted, to the power of the legislature over public 
corporations, and are not corporations virtually held to be 
public whenever it can be found that the business or purposes 
of the corporate organization affect the community generally ? 
The importance of the results of these decisions, alike to 
corporations and to the public, has been demonstrated in the 
period which has elapsed since they were announced. Upon 
the former they have_ had marked effect in discouraging cor-
porate investments, and have rendered corporate rights and 
franchises less valuable. Whether the public has derived from 
the decisions the benefit claimed for them is at least open to 
question. That part of the people which is most hostile to 
corporations finds, in these decisions, ~ncouragement for the 
expectation that the court will, at no distant day, reverse the 
principal case, an event by which it is supposed a millenium of 
relief for a corporation-oppressed people will at last arrive. 
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(6) In cases subsequent to the " Granger Cases," where the
constitutional protection of contracts was invoked in behalf of
corporations carrying on business injurious to the public health
or morals, the court has declared the principles governing the
exercise of the police power, and decided that charter-contracts
do not preclude the legislature from enacting such laws as are
necessary for the protection of the public; that the legislature
"cannot bargain away the public health or public morals,"
and that authority granted by statute to corporations or in-
dividuals to engage in particular private business detrimental
to the public, does not constitute a contract preventing the
withdrawal of such authority.*
(7) So, in a later case, the principle of the leading case has
been urged to protect the corporations from legislation concern-
ing their business intended for the security of persons dealing
with them, such as statutes regulating the business of life
insurance companies. Such legislation was held not to be
within the constitutional inhibition. It was decided that all
grants of corporate privileges and franchises are subject to the
condition that they shall not be abused, nor employed to de-
feat the ends for which they were conferred, and to an equally
implied condition that the legislature may prescribe such
reasonable regulations as will secure the ends for which the
corporation is organized, provided such regulations do not
interfere with or obstruct the enjoyment of the corporate
privileges. This principle is expressly declared to be essential
to the protection of the public against perils arising from the
ignorance, misconduct or fraud of those who manage corpora-
tions^
(8) The decisions in the New Orleans Gas and Water
* Beer Co. vs. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25; Fertilizing Co. vs. Hyde Park,
Ibid. 660; Boyd vs. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645; Stone vs. Mississippi, 101
U. S. 814; Butchers' Union Co. vs. Crescent City Co., Ill U. S. 746.
t Chicago Life Ins. Co. vs. Needles, 113 U. S. 574; and see The Sinking






































































































































(6) In cases subsequent to the "Granger Cases," where the 
constitutional protection of contracts was invoked in behalf of 
corporations carrying on business injurious to the public health 
or morals, the court has declared the principles governing the 
exercise of the police power, and decided that ()barter-contracts 
do not preclude the legislature from enacting such laws as are 
necessary for the protection of the public ; that the legislature 
"cannot bargain away the public health or public morals," 
and that authority granted by statute to corporations or in-
dividuals to engage in particular private business detrimental 
to the public, does not constitute a contract preventing the 
withdrawal of such authority.* 
(7) So, in a later case, the principle of the leading case has 
been urged to protect the corporations from legislation concern-
ing their business intended for the security of persons dealing 
with them, such as statutes regulating the business of life 
insurance companies. Such legislation was held not to be 
within the constitutional inhibition. It was decided that all 
grants of corporate privileges and franchises are subject to the 
condition that they shall not be abused, nor employed to de-
feat the ends for which they were conferred, and to an equally 
implied condition that the legislature may prescribe such 
reasonable regulations as will secure the ends for which the 
corporation is organized, provided such regulations do not 
interfere with or obstruct the enjoyment of the corporate 
privileges. This principle is expressly declared to be essential 
to the protection of the public against perils arising from the 
ignorance, misconduct or fraud of those who manage corpora-
tions. t 
(8) The decisions in the New Orleans Gas and Water 
*Beer Co. vs. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25; Fertilizing Co. VB. Hyde Park, 
Ibid. 660; Boyd VB. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645 ; Stone VB. Mississippi, 101 
U.S. 814; Butchera' Union Co. VB. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746. 
t Chica.go Life Ins. Co. vs. Needles, 113 U. S. 574; and see The Sinking 









cases,* at the last term of the court, maintain anew the validity
of exclusive charters as contracts, and declare the consistency
of all previous adjudications with the complete exercise of the
police power by the state, to protect the public health, the
public morals and the public safety. These cases involved the
validity of charters granting to private corporations exclusive
privileges to supply the city of New Orleans with gas and
water by means of pipes, mains and other conduits laid in the
public streets of the city. The court held that such charters
were contracts, which could not be impaired by subsequent
constitutional provisions by the state; that the business to be
carried on was of a public character; that the power of a
subsequent legislature to recall such grants could be limited by
the charter-contracts, and exclusive privileges granted in such
cases stand upon the same principle as exclusive grants to con-
struct and maintain highways, bridges and ferries, and exemp-
tion from taxation by charters; that the former decisions of
the court (Beer Co. vs. Massachusetts, Fertilizing Co. vs.
Hyde Park and Stone vs. Mississippi) sustaining the exercise
of the police power, rest on the principle that one legislature
cannot limit the power of its successors in relation to private
business affecting the public health or morals; that authority
given by the legislature to corporations or individuals to en-
gage in such particular private business does not constitute a
contract preventing withdrawal of such authority or the grant-
ing of it to others; but that the business of supplying a
city with gas or water is not ordinary business in which every-
one may engage, but is of a public nature; and that even in
such case a grant of exclusive privileges doesJ not withdraw
the business from the control of the police power, when the
public health, morals or safety require its exercise.
These decisions affirm again the adherence of the court to
the Dartmouth College case, but assert for the court the
power to determine in every case whether the nature of the






































































































































cases,* at the last term of the court, maintain anew the validity 
of exclusive charters as contracts, and declare the consistency 
of all previous adjudications with the complete exercise of the 
police power by the state, to protect the public health, the 
public morals and the public safety. These cases involved the 
validity of charters granting to private corporations exclusive 
privileges to supply the city of New Orleans with gas and 
water by means of pipes, mains and other conduits laid in the 
public streets of the city. The court held that such charters 
were contracts, which could not be impaired by subsequent 
constitutional provisions by the state ; that the business to be 
carried on was of a public character ; that the power of a 
subsequent legislature to recall such grants could be limited by 
the charter-contracts, and exclusive privileges granted in such 
cases stand upon the same principle as exclusive grants to con-
struct and maintain highways, bridges and ferries, and exemp-
tion from taxation by charters ; that the former decisions of 
the court (Beer Co. vs. Massachusetts, Fertilizing Co. vs. 
Hyde Park and Stone vs. Mississippi) sustaining the exercise 
y of_ the .E~~-~~,.I>.~!~!l- rest on the principle that one legislature 
1 cannot limit the power of its successors in relation to private 
business affecting the public health or morals ; that authority 
given by the legislature to corporations or individuals to en-
gage in such particular private business does not constitute a 
contract preventing withdrawal of such authority or the grant-
ing of it to others; but that the business of supplying a 
city with gas or water is not ordinary business in which every-
xone may engage, but i_~_ ,of ..,~-P~~-li~-~~- and that even in 
' such case a grant of exclusive privileges Mes' not withdraw 
the business from the control of the police power, when the 
public health, morals or safety require its exercise. 
These decisions affirm again the adherence of the court to 
the Dartmouth College case, but assert for the court the 
power to determine in every case whether the nature of the 
*115 u. s. 65(}-6i4. 
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business is private or public, and, consequently, when the
police power may be applied. These cases, by those who hold
that the decisions of the court cannot be reconciled, will be
regarded as strengthening their view of the court's inconsistency,
and as they consider the "Granger Cases" to be a radical
departure from the principal case,- they will only find in these
recent decisions a new and variant step, not in the path of con-
sistent legal principles. They will not hesitate, therefore, to
insist that the court, in every future case, as in its later adju-
dications, will decide as their views of public policy at the time
may require.
But if we can conceive the court, for a moment, as defending
their own course of decision, they would say, "The settled
law upholds the true purpose of the constitutional inhibition,
rightly protects the just rights of corporations, secures due
administration of their affairs, and consistently maintains the
integrity of the sovereign powers of the state, the police
power, the power of eminent domain, the reserved power of
amendment and repeal, and thus establishes sufficient and
effectual restraints upon corporations."
IV. This survey and examination of the principles estab-
lished as law by the leading case and succeeding decisions
resting upon it, considered together, has been undertaken with
a purpose to exhibit a connected view of the system, if it may
properly be so regarded. By such a view we may better esti-
mate the force and conclusiveness of the criticism which has
assailed the original decision and its consequences, and which
will continue, probably, to arraign the court before the bar of
public opinion. Public opinion, sooner or later, insensibly
moulds the law.* Whatever we may desire as lawyers,
*'"Public opinion may and does review the constitutional doctrines an-
nounced and acted upon by the Supreme Court of the United States, and
sometimes this review has been followed by very practical consequences."
Geo. Ticknor Curtis, in his discussion of "The Doctrine of Presumed
Dedication of Private Property to Public Use" (John Wiley & Sons,






































































































































business is prfrate or public, and, consequently, when the 
police power may be applied. These cases, by those who hold 
that the decisions of the court cannot be reconciled, will be 
regarded as strengthening their view of the court's inconsistency, 
and as they consider the " Granger Cases " to be a radical 
departure from the principal case; they will only find in these 
recent decisions a new and variant step, not in the path of con-
sistent legal principles. They will not hesitate, therefore, to 
insist that the court, in every future case, as in its later adju-
dications, will decide as their views of public policy at the time 
may require. 
But if w.e can conceive the court, for a moment, as defending . 
their own course of decision, they would say, "The settled 
law upholds the true purpose of the constitutional inhibition, 
rightly protects the just rights of corporations, secures due 
administration of their affairs, and consistently maintains the 
integrity of the sovereign powers of the state, the police 
power, the power of eminent domain, the reserved power of 
amendment and repeal, and thus establishes sufficient and 
effectual restraints upon corporations." 
IV. This survey and examination of the principles estab-
lished as law by the leading case and succeeding decisions 
resting upon it, considered together, has been undertaken with 
a purpose to exhibit a connected view o,f the system, if it may 
properly be so regarded. By such a view we may better esti-
mate the force and conclusiveness of the criticism which has 
assailed the original decision and its consequences, and which 
will continue, probably, to arraign the court before the bar of 
public opinion. Public opinion, sooner or later, insensibly 
moulds the law.* Whatever we .may desire a~ lawyers, 
*"Public opinion may and does review the constitutional doctrines an-
nounced and acted upon by the Supreme Court of the United States, and 
sometimes this review has been followed by very practical consequences." 
Geo. Ticknor Curtis, in his discm1sion of "The Doctrine of Presumed 
Dedication of Private Property to Public Use" (John Wiley & Sons, 
N. Y., 1881), citing" The Dred Scott Case." 
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however much we may wish that the judicial tribunals shall be
above the reach of popular opinion, nevertheless they are in-
fluenced by it. The law is the outgrowth of the necessities of
the community. It is idle for the profession to ignore the
serious charge that by reason of the decision in the Dartmouth
College case, corporations possess almost sovereign powers,
and that the doctrine of an inviolable charter-contract has
suspended, in their favor, the exercise of the sovereign powers
of the state. This charge must be met according to its
gravity; it must be considered whether the need of restraint
upon corporations is increasing or diminishing, and where the
remedies for corporate abuses and aggression are to be found,
if required. But this inquiry will not be prosecuted, either
in the legal profession or in the judicial tribunals, in any
spirit of undiscriminating enmity to corporations. The incal-
culable benefits they have conferred upon the country, the
great work they have performed in its progress and devel-
opment, are manifest. The legal profession can do much to
influence and guide public opinion; to show that the demand
for the reversal of the Dartmouth College case is impractica-
ble; to maintain the integrity and permanence of principles
which are, to say the least, settled law; to inculcate that
respect for the highest judicial tribunal of the country to
which it is entitled by its position, its history and the purity,
abilities and-learning of the judges. This may be done, and
ample room will be left for free and enlightened criticism of
its decisions. It is a reasonable expectation that the law will
be finally settled in such a way as to reconcile complete pro-
tection of corporate rights and vested interests with the unim-
paired exercise of the sovereign powers of the state. The
majority of the court regard that as even now accomplished,
but as to this there is a wide difference of opinion. One of
the judges who has most strenuously resisted the doctrine that
the taxing power can be restricted by charter-contract, pre-
dicts that it must be finally abandoned.* Whether this can
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however much we may wish that the judicial tribunals shall be 
above the reach of popular opinion, nevertheless they are in-
fluenced by it. The law is the outgrowth of the necessities of 
the community. It is idle for the profession to ignore the 
serious charge that by reason of the decision in the Dartmouth 
College case, corporations possess almost sovereign powers, 
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and that the doctrine of an inviolable charter-contract has 
suspended, in their favor, the exercise of the sovereign powers 
of the state. This charge must be met according to its 
gravity; it must be considered whether the need of restraint 
upon corporations is increasing or diminishing, and where. the 
remedies for corporate abuses and aggression are to be found, 
, if required. But this inquiry will not be prosecuted, either 
in the legal profession or in the judicial tribunals, in any 
spirit of undiscriminating enmity to corporations. The incal-
culable benefits they have conferred upon the country, the 
great work they have performed in its progress and devel-
opment, are manifest. The legal profession can do much to 
influence and guide public opinion ; to show that the demand 
for the reversal ~f the Dartmouth College case is impractica-
ble; to maintain the integrity and permanence of. principles 
which are, to say the least, settled law ; to inculcate that 
respect for the highest judicial tribunal of the country to 
which it is entitled by its position, its history and the purity, 
abilities and· learning of the judges. This may be done, and 
ample room will be left for free and enlightened criticism of 
its decisions. It is a. reasonable expectation that the law will 
be finally settled in such a way as to reconcile complete pro-
tection of corporate rights and vested interests with the unim-
paired exercise of the sovereign powers of the state. The 
majority of the court regard that as even now accomplished, 
but as to this there is a wide difference of opinion. One of 
the judges who has most strenuously resisted the doctrine that 
the taxing power can be restricted by charter-contract, pre-
dicts that it must be finally abandoned.* Whether this can 
*Miller, J. in Washington University vs. Rouse, 8 Wall. 444. 
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be done without overthrowing the whole system of decisions is
doubtful; because, as we have seen, the taxation cases are
those wherein the principle that a charter is a contract has
been most frequently and explicitly affirmed. If the prin-
cipal case is not reversed, still less is it probable that the
remedy suggested by the most earnest of its opponents, an
amendment of the Federal Constitution, will be attained. It
would be resisted by all the power of corporations, and such a
measure could not be enacted unless by practical unanimity
of all public interests and general concurrence of professional
and public sentiment. If the aims, the ambitions, the inde-
pendence of corporations should continue to be aggressive, and
become dangerous to the public welfare, remedies must and
will be found. What these shall be is not within the scope
of the present discussion.
As lawyers and as citizens we may indulge the hope that
these questions will be determined and these contentions com-
posed, with complete conservation of the judicial and legisla-
tive powers of government, and with just regard for the
interests of corporations, the protection of the public, and the
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be done without overthrowing the whole system of decisions is 
doubtful; because, as we ha Ye seen, the taxation cases are 
those wherein the principle that a charter is a contract has 
been most frequently and explicitly affirmed. If the prin-
cipal case is not reversed, still less is it probable that the 
remedy suggested by the most earnest of its opponents, an 
amendment of the Federal Constitution, will be attained. It 
would be resisted by all the power of corporations, and such a 
measure could not be enacted unless by practical unanimity 
of all public interests and general concurrence of professional 
and public sentiment. If the aims, the ambitions, the inde-
pendence of corporations should continue to be aggressive, and 
become dangerous to the public welfare, remedies must and 
will be found. 'Vhat these shall be is not within the scope 
of the present discussion. 
As lawyers and as citizens we may indulge the hope that 
these questions will be determined and these contentions com-
posed, with complete conservation of the judicial and legisla-
tive powers of government, and with just regard for the 
interests of corporations, the protection of the public, and the 
welfare and progress of the nation. 
